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In a recent article titled, "Latin American Debt Crisis and U.S. Trade" (CRS REVIEW, 02/87:16-18),
William H. Cooper and Patricia Wertman outline three stages of the debt crisis. The third and
present stage, they claim, is characterized by several alternative approaches to resolving the debt
problem, some of which are grounded in US policymakers' concern over rising American balance of
trade deficits.
The first stage of the debt crisis was marked by a case- by-case approach to the debt problem, based
on the premise that all debtor nations were unique and that the crisis was a short-term cashflow
problem. In this context, a short-term solution would suffice. The debt package developed for
Mexico in 1982 was an outcome of this interpretation, and served as a pattern for assisting other
debtor countries.
The central feature of the stabilization plan for Mexico was an SDR 3.4 billion (then about $3.9
billion) loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF loan package served as a
performance guarantee and as a catalyst, unlocking $5 billion more in new financing from Mexico's
foreign bank creditors. In turn, Mexico City agreed to implement austerity measures, including
import reduction, shifting resources to the export sector, and tightening fiscal and monetary
policies. The authors state that although this approach was "successful" in terms of reducing debtor
countires' current account deficits, its impact on US trade was decidedly negative.
Since 1982 US exports to its top four Latin American trade partners Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and
Venezuela plummeted, while imports continued to rise. Between year-end 1981 and year-end 1983,
for example, US exports to the four countries dropped 48%, while imports increased 11%. The shift
in the trade flow with these four countries caused US trade balances to go from a $4 billion surplus
in 1981 to a $12.5 billion deficit in 1983. US exports increased somewhat thereafter, but imports
continued to rise. Thus, by the end of 1985, the US had incurred a $14 billion trade deficit with the
four Latin American debtors.
Trade with Latin America as a whole followed the same pattern. By year-end 1985, the US trade
deficit with Latin America reached $17 billion, representing about 12% of the total US trade deficit
for that year. The second phase of debt crisis interpretation and solution was launched on October 8,
1985, when US Treasury Secretary James Baker presented another strategy at the IMF-World Bank
annual meeting in Seoul.
The case-by-case approach was retained, but the debt problem was also defined as a solvency
problem for which long-term solutions were necessary. In brief, the Baker Plan consisted of an
attempt to move beyond the limitations of International Monetary Fund (IMF) austerity programs,
by calling on both the private banks and multilateral development banks to increase lending to
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debtor nations. In turn, the debtor nation recipients would implement structural, or long-term
reforms. Since then the Baker Plan has become the target of many criticisms. For instance, it is
argued that the solution new financing only exacerbates the problem in that debtor nations will
only increase their debt burdens. Next, the quantity of financial resources suggested in the plan is
considered by many to be inadequate to the problem. The third stage in debt management scenarios
has emerged in part, as the result of dissatisfaction with the Baker initiative.
One third-stage alternative was introduced by Sen. Bill Bradley in June 1986. His plan suggests
annual debt relief equal to three percentage points off interest rates plus a 3% write-down of
principal on all outstanding commercial and bilateral government loans. Bradley was one of the first
US policymakers to emphasize the negative impact of the Latin American debt crisis on US exports
and employment. His and other recent alternatives are focused on stabilizing long-term growth and
development in debtor countries, which they argue would rebuild Latin American economies into
viable markets for US exports.
The US Congress is faced today with tough decisions as it seeks to respond to demands by US
industries demanding assistance in stemming the tide of import competition, and in determining
who will shoulder the costs of resolving the debt problem.

-- End --
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